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Private R&D Investment in Agriculture:
The Role of Incentives and Institutions
by Oscar Alfranca and Wallace E. Hnf&nan
This paper presents econometric evidence of the effectsof economic incentives and
institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments. Amodel is proposed
and fitted to annual data for seven European Union countries, 1984-1995. We find strong
impacts ofboth incentives and mstitutions on private agricultural R&D investment, and
including institutional factors strengthens the story and in some case changes greatly the results.
In particular, we reject the hypothesis that quality ofproperty rights does not matter. We find
that stronger contract enforcement, more efficient public bureaucracies, and stronger patent rights
lead to larger aggregate private agricultural R&D investment, other things equal. Furthermore,
we show that the impact ofacountry's patent rights on private agricultural R&D investment is
amplified by it also having amore efficient public bureaucracy and alarger stock of agricultural
higher education capital. We also find evidence ofpublic R&D crowding-out private agricultural
R&D, which does support recent privatization policies. Inter-country private R&D spillins
increase national agricultural R&D investment.
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Private R&D Investments in Agriculture;
The Role of Incentives and Institutions
by Oscar Alfranca and Wallace E. Huffinan'
12-29-99
Research anddevelopment (R&D) produce knowledge and innovations that have become
amajor source ofproductivity change and economic growth ofagriculture in developed
countries. In these countries, agricultural R&D is largely ashared activity between the public
and private sectors, but since the mid-1970s, private agricultural R&D has been growing much
faster generally than public R&D (Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1998; Huffinan and Just 1999).'
Private agricultural R&D is undertaken to increase the expected long-term profitability ofsuch
firms. However, public policies, quality ofproperty rights, and economic incentives can be
expected to affect these investment decisions, and absence ofsecure property rights and
contractual rights seems likely to discourage private investment (Knack and Keefer 1995).
The objective ofthis paper is to present econometric evidence ofthe effects ofeconomic
incentives and institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments.
Although the European Union is undergoing major economic integration, member coimtries
continue to exhibit substantial variation in the quality ofproperty rights and in the size and
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2relative importance of agriculture. We suggest thatthisprovides a fertile areafor testing the •
hypothesis that the quality of property rights, e.g., the strength ofpatent rights, extent of contract
enforcement, public bureaucratic delays, and nationalization risk, does notaffect aggregate
private agricultural R&D investments. Amodel is proposed andfitted to annual data for seven
European Union countries, 1984-1995. We find strong impacts ofboth incentives and
institutions onprivate agricultural R&D investment, and including institutional factors
strengthens thestory and in some cases changes greatly the results.
Private R&D
In Agriculture
In the European Union and in OECD countries, a large share ofprivate agricultural R&D
is invested in agricultural inputs—agricultural chemicals, plant breeding, farm machinery, and
animal health-and food and kindred products but relatively little (less than 10 percent) in farm
level technologies (Klotz, Fuglie, and Pray 1995; Alston, Pardey, and Smith 1997). In the EU,
private agricultural R&D has been focused on agro-chemistry (folliculars, fertilizers, micro-
nutrients, fungicides, insecticides, and soil disinfectants), plant breeding and varietal
development, plant nutrition, plant growth regulators, plant parasitology, marine aquiculture,
rawmaterial production from cultured media (e.g., com syrups, sugars), enzymatic conversion
ofstarch to sugars, biotechnology in plants, combine and harvesting machine development,
safety and ergonomics in farm machinery, and veterinary pharmaceuticals.
The pnvate R&D system differs across western European countries, and the focus of
private agricultural R&D differs (Amon 1989). In the U.K., agricultural chemicals, machinery,
and feeding stuffs have been important (Thirtle et al. 1997, Whittemore 1998). Also, the
3Cambridge Plant Breeding Institute was transferred from the public sector to the private sector
(Unilever) in 1998. In the Netherlands, private research onhorticultural crops is large. In
France, privateR&D, e.g., in Vilmoria, theCooperative Society for Research and
Experimentation ofthe Eastern Pyrenees, the Technical Institute ofthe Sugar Beet Industry are
mamly focused on plant breeding, pesticides, and fertilizers. InGermany, private R&D is
focused on pesticides and fertilizers, e.g., BASF, Baker, Kali +Salz, Hochst, agricultural
machinery, e.g., Deutz, Mercedes, and animal feed and pharmaceuticals. InSweden and
Denmark, private research is on fertilizers, forestry, and communication systems.
Cross-country comparisons ofprivate and public agricultural R&D expenditures are made
difficult by the fact that each country has its own definition ofwhat is included mprivate and
public research and the restructuring ofpublic agricultural research insome ofthese countries
over the past two decades has changed what is now included in public and private research
(Huffinan and Just 1999). For example, in the United Kingdom, some public agricultural
research institutions have been sold to the private sector (Thirtle, Palladino, and Piesse 1997) and
in the Netherlands, research institutions of the Ministry ofAgriculture, Nature Management, and
Fisheries have been turned into quasi-public or private institutions. German data have special
problems due to the fact that two separate countries existed before 1990 and pre-1990 data cover
onlyWest Germany.
Even with these deficiencies, we believe that it is useful to present some comparisons
across EU countries. Table 1presents information showing large differences in the share of
private agricultural research expenditures in total public and private agricultural research
expenditures of 13 European Union countries for 1985, 1990, and 1995. The Netheriands and
4Sweden stand out for theirlarge private sector shares, and Germany, Ireland, andSpain have
unusually small shares. Furthermore, these data do notsuggest a strong increase in theprivate
R&D share over 1985-1995.
Prior Evidence
Private firms invest inR&D to increase their expected long term profitability.^ Research
and development leads to discoveries which are fi-equently embodied innewproducts or
processes that can be used inan on-going commercial production and marketing operation,
patents that can be used or licensed for afee to others, and other intellectual property (Geroski
1995).^
Previous empirical studies have found effects ofprivate R&D on cost ofproduction,
factor intensities, and productivity and on patenting rates. At the industry level, Bernstein and
Nadiri (1988) found strong production cost reducing and factor intensity effects of own R&D
and inter-industry R&D spillms. Knowledge spillovers/spillins are atype ofpositive externality
ofscientific discoveries on the productivity offirms or laboratories which neither make the
discovery themselves nor licensed its use from the holder of intellectual property rights. Adams
(1990) found that within and between industry R&D spillins operate with along lag as key
determmants ofmdustry productivity. At the firm level, Bemstem and Nadiri (1989) found that
afirm's own R&D and inter-firm spillins reduce production cost and that R&D spillins are a
substimte for afirm's own investment in R&D. Mairesse and Hall (1995) explore the tuning '
ofthe relationship between R&D and productivity in apanel ofFrench and American
manufacturing firms. International studies ofspillovers include Lichtenberg (1992), Grossman
and Helpman (1991), and Coe and Helpman (1995), and Park (1995).
5Adams (1998) used datafor firms in theU.S. chemical, machinery, electrical equipment,
andtransportation equipment industries to examine effects of academic, largely public, research
and other firm's industrialR&D researchon the productivity of industrial laboratories. Own
laboratory R&D, R&D spillins firom the rest ofthe company's R&D activities, and R&D spillins
fi-om the rest ofthe industry are shown to have positive effects on the number ofpatents granted
for a laboratory. Academic research isshown to have spillin effects on private laboratories
largely through apositive impact on the share ofthe staffholdmg Ph.D. degrees and not directly
on the number ofpatents granted. In contrast, Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998) found that
research universities have apositive impact on nearby biotechnology firms through identifiable
market exchange between particular university star scientist and not to generalized knowledge
spillovers.
Arelated strand ofthe literature has examined the potential complementary relationship
between capital, technology and skilled labor. This literature finds that capital and technology
are complementary with skilled labor, but factor saving in unskilled labor or skill biased, e.g., see
Griliches (1969), Bound and Johnson (1992), and Herman, Bound, and Griliches (1994). Adams
(1999) finds that afirm sown R&D, industry wide R&D, and plant level capital are factor using
in labor, and factorsaving in materials.
It is widely accepted that absences ofsecure property rights and contractual rights
discourage private investment, e.g., North 1990, p. 54, Olsen 1982, Knack and Keefer 1995,
Mauro 1995, by reducing the expected rate of return and increasing the riskiness of investments.
Weak property rights might arise as non-existent or ineffective patent laws but more generally
fi-om inefficient and weak institutions, e.g., weak contract enforcement, bureaucratic delays in
6provision ofcivil services, and possible nationalization ofprivate property without fair
compensation. For example, Knack and Keefer (1995) show that the rate ofaverage gross
private investment over 1974-1989 for a set ofabout 100 countries was increased significantly by
lowerbusiness environment risk, i.e.,more secure and efficient property rights.
Forprivate investments in R&D, thepresence and strength of intellectual property rights
areveryimportant. Without formal intellectual property rights, private innovators andfirms are
left to rely ontrade secrets which vary greatly across discoveries inthe amount ofprotection they
provide. Inhybrid plant varieties, the hybridization process gives relatively strong intellectual
property protection. Forproduction processes, trade secrets give amajor competitive edge tothe
discoverer (Geroski 1995). However, for chemical, mechanical, and electrical innovations, trade
secrets are largely ineffective because skilled innovators orscientists can "reverse engineer" the
product.
Other intellectual property rights include patents, breeders' rights, copyrights, and
trademarks. The patent, which provides protection for embodied inventions, is akey intellectual
property right for private firms investing in agricultural R&D in western developed countries.
The creator must reveal his/her discovery and in turn receives alimited monopoly position on
use or control for about 20 years. When innovators charge high prices for the use oftheir
discoveries or arelative high price for products embodying their innovation, this creates astrong
economic incentive for anew mnovator to use the revealed information as abasis for innovating
around the existing patent or to mfiinge on the patent. In agriculture, where there are alarge
number of fanners and economic, land, and climatic conditions are heterogenous, innovators'
profits are heavily conditioned by achieving large scale, perhaps international adoption. This
can
7only beachieved if theprivate companies share a significant partof the economic surplus with
fanners (and land owners). Private companies selling new agricultural technologies can capture
some of the economic rents (e.g., only about one-third to one-half), but it is economically
impossible for them toperfectly discriminate orcollect all the rents. See Falck-Zepada, Traxler,
and Nelson (1999) for evidence on Bt cotton.
During the 1980s, patent protection was extended tothe creative products ofhuman
ingenuity in living organisms, plants, and nonhuman mammals. These discoveries have been
dramatic enough that patent courts have ruled that they are not the "products ofnature" and,
hence, can bepatented. Transgenetic plants and anhnals have been thesource of ethical and
consumer concerns (e.g., see Gaskill, Bauer, Durant, and Allum 1999).
Two technological innovations have the potential to greatly strength IPRs associated with
biological innovations. DNA finger-printing technology adds new precision to identification
and ownership clauns and makes "moonlight" plant breeding easily punishable. The recent
discovery and patent by the USDA and Delta and Pine Land Company ofthe technology
protection system (TPS) has the potential to greatly strengthen innovators rights to improvements
in open pollinate crops. TPS is atransgenic system comprised ofacomplex array ofgenes and
gene promoters which in the normal state are inactive. Seeds carrying TPS can have atreatment
applied before sale to farms which will trigger an irreversible series ofevents at the time of
germiriation and renders the seed produced by farmers sterile. Hence, the net result for "saved
seed" is essentially the same as for hybrid crop varieties which have been around for ahnost a
century. Seeds from hybrid varieties do not reproduce themselves either.
8Private companies have historically found it unprofitable to invest inR&D for open
pollmated crops because of farmers' ability to save and replant then- ownseed. With TPS,
farmers can beprevented from using saved-seed for replanting. This outcome poses no ethical
issue in developed countries, but some have raised ethical issues offarmers in developing
countries being excluded from access to new plant varieties that carry TPS. Since TPS treated
seeds are sterile, the technology cannot accidentally be transferred to wild plant species or non-
TPS carrying crop varieties.
Patent laws for the European Union countries have been strengthened over the past four
decades, and are in general much stronger than in developing coimtries, but somewhat less than
in the United States. Ginarte and Park (1997) have produced anational patent rights index for ''
over 100 countries by combining scores on five separate components ofpatent law: (i) extent
ofcoverage, (ii) membership in international patent agreements, (iii) provision for loss of
protection, (iv) enforcementmechanisms, and (v) duration ofprotection. Each separate
component is assigned avalue between 0and 1, and acoimty's patent rights index is then the
summation over the five component scores. Among EU countries, Finland, Portugal and Ireland
have had relatively low values over 1960-90, and Sweden, Germany, and Denmark have
significantly strengthened their patent rights (see Table 2).
Even with strong intellectual property rights, the private sector will significantly under
invest mdiscoveries that are ofapure pubhc good type' e.g., discoveries from the basic and
pretechnology sciences, or applied discoveries that do not lead to profitable products,
e.g., resource and environmental quality, food safety, policy, minor crops Huffinan and Evenson
1993; Huf&nan and Just 1999). Hence, financing these discoveries is left largely to the public
9sector, and they provide the potential for public and private R&D to be complementary rather
than substitute activities in generating new agricultural technologies. On the other hand, if
public R&D competes directly with private R&D, public and private R&D will be substitutes,
or one will tend to crowd out the other.
The Econometric Model, Data, and Results
An econometric modelof national aggregate annual private R&D investment is specified
and fitted to panel dataconsisting of seven EUcountries (Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, andSweden) over 1984-1995; The primary reason whyallEUcountries arenot
included in the data set is missing data on some ofthe relevant variables.
The Econometric Model
Theeconometric model of aggregate gross real private R&D investment is onethat
incorporates variables representing the effect ofincentives, public policies, and institutions.
The institutional variables represent both the extent and security ofproperty rights and
contractual arrangements. Definitions ofvariables are summarized in Table 3."
The econometric private agricultural R&D investment equation is;
(I)
/
Cn(PRRINV,,) = £ CONSTANT(C) +P2lRATE„+P3to(PRRCAP„ )+P,Cn(PSPILL„.,)
+p5Cn(FPA„) +P,CROP„+ P,{nPURCAP„^ +P,Cn(HEDC„.,) +P,CE„
+PioBD,,+ P„NP„+ P,jPAT„+ P,3lQ„ +P,^[CnPRRCAP„.,] • [toPURCAP,
+P,5[{nPRRCAP„_,
Jt-1
{nHEDC^.j
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where is a randomdisturbance term representing the effectsofomittedvariables that are
peculiar to botha country (C) and timeperiod (E). It has a zeromean, constant variance over
time for any given country but to differ across countries, and to have non-zero contemporaneous
correlation across countries.
We turn to a formal statement ofhypotheses about the aggregate private agricultural
R&D investment relationship. We expect p2 <0, or alarger real interest cost reduces private
R&D investment. Lagged private R&D stock represents both astock ofpast discoveries that
may be useful in future discoveries but also provides an indicator ofthe "using up" ofsome of
the innovative potential ofearlier scientific discoveries (Huffinan and Evenson 1993). The
impact of the lagged stock ofprivate R&D may be affected by the lagged stock ofpublic
agricultural R&D (PURCAP) and stock ofhigher educational capital as modified by patent laws
and bureaucratic delays. The overall impact is summarized in equation (2);
a«n(PRRINVj^)
^^ a«n(PRRCAP,..,) = ^ CnPURCAP,^., +P^^CnHEDC,,.,]* PAT,, *BD,,.
P,4 will be positive ifpublic research complements private R&D and to be negative if they
are substitutes or cause crowding out. Human capital investments in agricultural scientists,
managers, and agricultural input sales representatives are expected to raise the profitability of
private R&D with given patent laws (PAT) and quality ofcivil services (BD). Hence, is
expected to be positive. Thus, the expected net effect of lagged private R&D stock on current
private R&D investment could be positive, negative, or zero.
Pnvate agncultural R&D investments in one country may impact investment decisions
other countries through R&D spillovers. See Evenson (1991) and Johnson and Evenson (1999,
m
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Table 10) for a discussion of evidencefor spillinsof patented innovations in Europe.^ These
spillovers are expected to be larger and more direct when the R&D is undertaken by large
multinational companies, but even for R&D undertaken by national companies, some inter-
country externalities may occur. The spillins are expected to reduce the cost of local innovation,
to increase the expected return to local private R&D and to increase private R&D investment,
i.e., p4 > 0. The two-year lag for PSPILL incorporates the likely slower transmission of
information and technology when it must cross national boundaries, e.g., due to different
languages, cultures, etc.® . .
Thepotential sizeof themarket forprivate agricultural innovations is proxied by the
volume ofagricultural production (FPA) and thecrop shares of final agricultural production
(CROP). The potential for using commercial intermediate inputs in the EU is higher incrop than
in livestock production because of thestigma against long-term useofmedicated livestock feeds
and growth hormones. The expected signs for pj and pg are positive.
Themarginal effects of the publicstock of local agricultural R&Don current investment
in private R&D is
aCnCPRRINV.,)
(?) — — = P7+ P.JnPRRCAP., ,.
a«n(PURCAPj,_j) '
Ifpublic R&D is generally crowding out private R&D, then the sign for equation (3) will be
negative. This ismore likely to occur ifpublic and private R&D stocks are substitutes
(i.e., pi4 <0) than ifthey are complementary (i.e., p,4 >0).
Larger public agricultural human capital is expected to increase private R&D investment
(HufEman and Evenson, 1993; Huffinan 1999), i.e.^ the overall sign for equation (4) is positive:
8fin(PRRINV,J
aanHHBC,.:)=P--P-
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fnPRRCAPjj.j »PAT,/BD,.
A large stock ofpublic agricultural R&D, stronger local patent laws, or more efficient civil
services are expected to complement private agriculturalR&D and to increase the size of the
investment (i.e., pij > 0).
The effects of property rights andquality of institutions are represented in indexes for
contract enforcement (CE), bureaucratic delays (BD), nationalization potential (NP), and patent
rights (PAT), Greater contract enforcement and fewer bureaucratic delays are expected to
increase private R&D investment. Thus, theexpected sign of P9 is positive. Theeffects of
bureaucratic delays, however, may be moderated/amplified by other variables. The hypothesis
advanced here is that a larger stock ofprivate R&D, stock ofagricultural higher education capital
orstronger patent laws are complementary with efficiency inpublic bureaucracy,
0Cn(PRRINV.J
^^ aCBD;) P,5[fnPRRCAP„.,] •[CnHEDC,,.,] •PAT,, ,
and pi5 is positive. Preferential treatment of local companies is expected to increase their private
investment in agricultural R&D but to reduce foreign direct investment. Hence, the net effect of
NP and the sign of P,i are,ambiguous. Stronger patent rights are expected to increase private
R&D investments because private firms can expect to obtain a larger share ofthe social benefits
from innovations resulting from their research and development. However, in our model we
allow for and test to see ifthe effects ofpatent laws are modified by the stock of lagged private
13
agricultural R&D capital, the stock oflagged agricultural higher education capital, or absence of
bureaucratic delays.
a5n(PRRINV,J
acPAT,)
«nPRRCAPjj_j {nHEDCj^_, ♦ BD.ix
We expect the signs of pi2 and P15 to be positive.
Public policies are important for determining the quality of infrastructure ina country,
e.g., quality ofcommunication and transportation. Better quality infrastructure isgenerally seen
as reducing communication and transport costs and thereby facilitating technical change and
increasmg the profitability ofprivate R&D. The expected sign ofP13 is positive.
The CONSTANT terms inequation (1) are country-specific intercept terms orfixed
effects. They represent time invariant but unspecified country-specific factors that affect private
agricultural R&D investment, including definitions ofprivate R&D, agro-climatic conditions,
major soil types. Because the econometric model is to be fitted to data over arelatively short
time period, a random-effect model is not used because under these conditions estimates tend to
bequite imprecise (Hsiao 1986).
The Results
Equation (1) is fitted by the Zellner SUR estimation method to the 77 observations
obtained by pooling the 11 observations for seven EU countries. The estimated coefficients
and t-value are reported in Table 4, regression equation (1).
Overall, the fitted model performs well. Most coefficients are different from zero at
the 5percent significance level, and the hypothesis that the R&D investment equation has no
explanatory power (i.e., all coefficients except for country fixed effects are zero) is rejected at the
14
1percent significance level. Turning to particular effects, higher real interest cost, a larger
volume ofagricultural production, ora larger share ofcrop output intotal agricultural production
increases private agricultural R&D investments asexpected. The effect of a larger (lagged)
private agricultural R&D stock is to reduce current private agricultural R&D investments. The
elasticity atthe sample mean is -0.49, and the negative elasticity implies that past private R&D is
limiting current R&D through net exhaustion ofthe innovative potential. This seems tobe
occurring because public and private agricultural R&D are substitutes (i.e., P^^<0) rather than
being complements. The effect of(lagged) intercountiy spillin ofprivate agricultural R&D
capital is as expected to increase private agricultural R&D investment.
The.effect oflarger domestic public agricultural R&D capital is to decrease private
agricultural R&D investment, and the elasticity at the sample mean of {n(PRRCAP) is -0.640.
This is the crowding out effect at work. The effect of larger agricultural higher education capital
is to increase private agricultural R&D investment as expected. When equation (4) is evaluated
at the sample mean ofthe regressors using our estimated coefficients, the elasticity is 0.31.
Furthermore, the positive impact arises from the positive interaction effect ofeducation capital
with private agricultural R&D capital, strength ofpatent laws, and more efficient bureaucracies,
i.e., a generally favorable private R&D investment environment.
More generally our results show that the quality ofacountry's property rights has a
sigmficant and important effect on private agricultural R&D investment. When acountry has
better contract enforcement (larger CE), agricultural R&D investment increases. Amore
efficient public bureaucracy also increases the investment in private agricultural R&D. At the
sample mean when equation (5) is evaluated using our estimated coefficients, the marginal effect
15
is 0.05. The results also show that the positive impact is operating largely through interaction
effects wdth private agricultural R&D capital, agricultural higher education capital, and a
country's patent rights.
Consistent withexpectation^ andnottoo surprising, when a country has stronger
patentrights, as reflected in the levelof PAT, private agricultural R&D investment increases
significantly. The size ofthe marginal effect ofPAT obtamed form evaluating equation (6) at
the sample mean ofregressors usmg our estimated coefficients is 1.9. Furthermore, larger
private agricultural R&D capital, larger agricultural higher education capital, and amore efficient
public bureaucracy are complementary with stronger patent rights in affecting private R&D
investment.
Increasing a country's nationalization potential (NP) has anegative and significant effect
on private agricultural R&D investment. In countries where the expropriation ofprivate property
is unlikely, the interpretation is that stronger preferences ofnational companies over foreign ones
increases private agricultural R&D investment. This result suggests that giving preferences to
domestic companies may be important to the development ofnew technologies to meet country-
specific needs and that country-specific conditions are relatively important to agricultural R&D
investment.
The estimated coefficient ofacountry's infrastructure quality is negative and significant,
which contradicts our expectations. It may be that undeveloped agricultural input markets have
much more potential than developed ones, but the undeveloped markets are located where
infrastructure is poor. Ifthis is the case, thenlQ could be measuring another dimension ofthe
expected profitability ofnational markets for agricultural innovations. Alternatively, with high
16
infrastructure quality, it may beeasier for agricultural technologies to beimported, and this could
reducedomestic investment in privateagricultural R&D.'
The estimates of thecountry-specific fixed effects are largest for theNetherlands,
Austria, and Sweden (ordered fi-om largest). They are smallest for Portugal, Italy and Spain
(ordered firom smallest). This leaves the fixed-effect for Germany inthe mid-range.
Furthermore, the differences in size ofthese fixed effects do imply large differences in private
agricultural R&D investments associated with time-invariant country-specific effects, e.g., by a
factor of16 firom smallest (Portugal) to largest (Netheriands).
Although our empirical results for the institutional variables are quite strong, we also
perform ajoint test ofthe null hypothesis that p, = =p^^ =0in equation (1),
i.e., "no institutional effects." The sample value of the Fstatistic for this test is 11 which is large
relative to the critical value with 5and 49 degrees of freedom of4.4 at the 5percent significance
level. Hence, we soundly reject the null hypothesis that institutional variables, as reflected in the
quality ofproperty rights, do not effect domestic private agricultural R&D investments.
The estimated coefficients ofregression equation (1) with the restriction ofno
institutional effects are reported in Table 4, regression equation (2). It is noteworthy that signs
for the marginal impacts ofPSPILL, CROP, and HEDC on private agricultural R&D mvestment
are reversed, compared to regression (1), and that many of the other coefficients differ by more
than 50 percent. Hence, excluding the institutional variables biases greatly the implied impact
ofthe included variables on private agricultural R&D investment. This is consistent with the
institutional variables being correlated with the other variables and being important factors
determining domestic private agricultural R&D investments.
17
Conclusions
Research and development have been shown to be major forces behind growth in
agricultural output, especially agricultural productivity increases. Some prior research has
focused on modeling and explaining the public sector's willingness to invest in agricultural
researchin an environmentwhereR&Dproduces impurepublic goods and positive inter-
jurisdictional spillins are regional rather than global (e.g., Khann^ Huffinan, and Sandier 1994).
Thecurrent study, however, is the first to examine aggregate privateagricultural R&D
mvestment using a panel of developed countries andto identify separate effects of economic
incentives and economic institutions.
Using annual data for seven European Union countries, we rejected the hypothesis that
quality ofproperty rights does not matter. We have shown that stronger contract enforcement,
more efficient public bureaucracies, and stronger patent rights lead to larger private agricultural
R&D investment, other things equal. Furthermore, we have shown that the impact ofacountry's
patent rights on private agricultural R&D investment is amplified by it also having amore
efficient public bureaucracy and a larger stock of agricultural higher education capital.
Anunexpected result was the finding that a stronger preference ofnationals over
foreigners increases private R&D investment. This seems most likely due to cross-country
heterogeneity ofagriculture, and nationals being better positioned to develop technologies to
meet domestic conditions. For these EU countries, we found evidence ofpublic R&D crowding
out private agricultural R&D, rather than being complementary. This suggests an imbalance in
the public sector sinvestments in discoveries, i.e., the public sector may be investing too heavily
in applied discoveries that compete directly with private R&D and too little in discoveries firom
18
basic/general andpretechnology sciences. Over time, thequality of intellectual property rights in
our sample of EU countries has generallyincreased, and given our results, this is one force for
larger private sector agricultural R&D investment, but thepublic sector—largely national
governments—may have overlooked these changes. However, some ofthe recent efforts to
privatize agricultural research in Europe are consistent with an attempt to re-establish the optimal
public andprivate mixture ofagricultural R&D.
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Endnotes
1. InEuropean countries subject to theCommon Agricultural Policy (CAP); which had
highintervention prices andexternal protection, large surpluses of some agricultural
commodities, e.g., milk and cereals, accumulated. This created a skepticism of the need
forpublic agricultural research to increase agricultural productivity.
2. Schumpeter (1950) was a pioneer in the determinants of innovation in firms, and
Schmookler (1962, 1966) and Mansfield (1964) provided early empirical evidence ofthe
effects of industrial R&D onfirm profitability and patenting rates.
3. See Moschini and Lapan (1997) onissues inoptimal pricing ofprivate innovations and the
distribution of benefits of new technologies.
4. Our empirical measure ofthe stock ofR&D capital draws heavily on the methodological
approach suggested byGriliches (1979,1984,1998) when one has limited data.
5. See Voon and Edwards (1999) for adiscussion ofsome ofthe general equilibrium effects of
regional R&D policies in a trade model.
6. Evenson (1991) provides some evidence on international patenting ofagricultural inventions
and their country of origin.
7. We, however, found no statistically significant effect ofacountry's openness to trade on
private agricultural R&D investment.
Table 1. Private Agricultural R&D Expenditures as a Share ofTotal Public and
Private Agricultural R&D Expenditures, EU-13, selected years (percent)
Country 1985 1990 1995
Austria 41.2 30.9 37.6
Denmark 44.5 31.2 27.7
Finland 41.3 29.2 36.2
France 24.9 19.1 26.0
Gemiany 13.7 11.9 9.0
Greece 29.2 22.1 15.0
Ireland 16.6 25.6 12.8
Italy 30.1 24.6 28.4
Netherlands 60.8 62.2 58.5
Norway 34.2 46.6 38.4
Portugal , 14.4 36.7 21.3
Spain 14.3 8.7 8.2
Sweden 52.4 43.3 ^ 45.0
Table 2. National Indexes ofPatent Rights, Western Europe 1960-1990
Country/Region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Western Europe ,
Austria 3.38 3.38 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.81 4.24
Belgium 3.05 3.38 3.38 3.38 3.38 4.05 3.90
Denmark 2.33 2.66 - 2.80 2.80^ 3:62 3.76 3.90
Finland 1.99 1.99 2.14 2.14 2.95 2.95 2.95
France 2.76 3.10 3.24 3.24 3.90 3.90 3.90
Germany 2.33 2.66 3.09 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71
Greece 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.32
Ireland 2.23 2.56 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Italy 2.99 3.32 3.32 3.46 3.71 4.05 4.05
Netherlands 2.95 3.29 3.61 3.47 4.24 4.24 • 4.24
Norway 2.66 2.66 2.80 2.80 3.29 3.29 3.29
Portugal 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Spain 2.95 3.29 3.29 3.29 • 3.29 3.29 3.62
Sweden 2.33 2.66 2.80 2.80 ^ 3.47 3.47 3.90
Switzerland 2.38 2.71 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.80 3.80
United Kingdom 2.70 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.57 3.57 3.57
subgroup mean 2.60 2.82 2.97 2.97 3.39 3.46 3.52
United States 3.86 3.86 3.86 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52
Mean: 111 countries 2.13 2.22 2.27 2,28 2.40 2.44 2.46
Somce: Adapted from Ginarte and Park 1997.
Table 3.
PRRINV
IKATE
PRRCAP.j
RSPILL.2
FPA
CROP
PURCAP.i
HEDC.i
CE
Definitions of variables
Aggregate private investment in agricultural R&D. National annual
aggregate real private expenditures or gross investment on agricultural R&D
divided by the price index for final agricultural production (OECD,
Economic Indicators).
Interest costs. The real interest cost ofprivate investment is the short term
interest rate on national government bonds less the annual rate of inflation on
gross domestic product (Int. Monetary Fund).
Aggregate private agricultural R&D capital. The one-year lagged value
ofthe real national stock ofprivate agricultural R&D; nominal R&D
expenditures were deflatedby the price index for final agricultural production
then the stock derived using theperpetixal inventory method assuming a
12 percent depreciation rate.
Index ofthe spillin potential of privateagricultural research. The stockof
public agricultural R&D in othersample countries laggedtwo years.-
Aggregate agricultural production. Total value of final agricultural
production (OECD, Economic Indicators) divided bytheprice index for
final agricultural production.
Crop share. Value of cropproductionas a share of total value of final
agricultural production (OECD, Economic Indicators).
Aggregate public agricultural R&D capital. One year lagged nominal
national public agricultural R&D expenditures (OECD, BasicScience and
Technology, Technology Statistics) deflated by the price index for final
agricultural production, then the stock derived using the perpetual inventory
method assuming a 12percent depreciation rate.
Aggregate agriculture higher education capital. One year lagged national
nominal higher education expenditures were deflated by the price index for
final agricultural production and the stock derived using the perpetual
inventory method assuming a 12 percent depreciation rate.
Contract enforcement. Measures the relative degree to which contractual
agreements are honored and complications presented by language and
mentality difference, scored 0-4 with higher scores for greater enforcement
(Knack and Keefer 1995).
Table 3 (continued)
BD Bureaucratic delays. Measures the speed and efficiency of the civil service,
scored 0-4 with higher scores for greater efficiency (Knack and Keefer 1995).
NP Nationalization potential. Measures.the.extent.ofpreferential treatment of
nationals over foreigners in legal matters (and risk ofexpropriation for no
compensation), scored0-4whichhigher scores indicating relatively more
favorable treatmentor less risk to foreign interests (Knack and Keefer 1995).
PAT Patent rights index. An indexobtainedby summing0-to-l scores for
eachof five categories ofpatentlaw: extentof coverage, membership in
international patent agreements, provisionfor loss of protection,enforcement
mechanism, andduration of protection (Ginarte andPark 1997). Overall the
index takes values 0-5 with large index indicating stronger patent rights.
IQ Infrastructure quality. An assessment offacilities for and easp of
communication between company headquarters andoperations, andwithin
country, andquality of transportation^ scored 0-4with higherscores
indicating better quality (Knack and Keefer 1995).
CONSTANTCj) Dummy variable taking a value of1ifobservation iscountry j 0=Austria,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and0 otherwise.
- Each country's private agricultural R&D expenditures were converted to real 1990 purchasing power of
parity dollars before creating the capital stock. The aggregation ofprivate R&D stocks across countries
applies the methodology employed by Khanna, Huffinan, and Sandier (1994) for aggregating across U.S.
states. Of course, other weighting schemes exist.
Table 4. SUR Estimates of Investment Equation for National Aggregate Private
Agricultural R&D: Seven EU Countries 1984-1995 (t-values in parentheses)
Regression
Regressors
Sample Mean
of variable
Eq(l)
coeff t-value
Eq(2)
coeff t-value
IRATE 0.031 -1.530 (3.92) -2.748 (3.40)
Cn(PRRACAPi.i) 6.848 0.679 (3.08) 1.407 (8.37)
toCPSPILLtJ -0.700 0.638 (3.35) -0.170 (0.49)
^n(FPAJ 8.438 1.194 (3.28) 1.362 (3.44)
CROP, 0.326 1.584 (1.68) -1.094 (1.05)
«n(PURCAP,.i) 5.095 1.318" (4.67) 1.604 (5.63)
to(HEDC,.i) 4.815 -0.087 (0.42) -1.192 (6.20)
CEt 3.30 0.688 (2.53)
BDt 2.40 -0.791 (3.20)
NR, 3.08 -0.593 (3.86)
PAT, 4.03 1.424 (3.49)
IQt 3.30 -0.933 (3.04) -0.709 (3.87)
(«nPRRCAP,.i) X({nPURCAP,.i) -0.286 (6.00) -0.175 (5.86)
(CnPRRCAP,.i) X(CnHEDQ.i) x PAT, xBD, 0.006 (3.08)
CONSTANT (Austria) -10.043 (3.40) -9.423 (2.79)
CONSTANT (Germany) -14.275 (3.87) -11.495 (2.75)
CONSTANT (Italy) -23.906 (5.87) -15.375 (3.79)
CONSTANT (Netherlands) -8.97 (2.60) -lo.ior (2.50)
CONSTANT (Portugal) 24.667 (6,74) -16.128 (4.76)
CONSTANT (Spain) -20.723 (5.77) - -17.296 (4.61)
CONSTANT(Sweden) -11.823 (4.07) -8.011 (2.42)
R^ (adjusted)
Durbin Watson
0.967
1.333
0.966
1.309
